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Criminal Appellate Procedure-CONFLICT
OF LAWS-STATE
RIGHTTO APPEAL
IN A CRIMINAL
CASEREMOVED
TO FEDERAL
COURT-Arizonav. Manypenny, 608 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1979).
While on duty in Arizona as a border patrolman of the
United States Immigration and Naturalization Services, William
Dale Manypenny fired three shotgun blasts at a fleeing suspect,
hitting him in the back and paralyzing him. The State of Arizona
brought a criminal prosecution against Manypenny in state
court, charging him with assault with a deady weapon.' On
Manypenny's motion, the case was removed to federal court.'
The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict of
guilty. Manypenny then made a motion for arrest of judgment,
which was granted.3 The state responded with a motion for reconsideration, which was also granted. Upon reconsideration,
the district court construed Manypenny's motion for arrest of
judgment as a motion for acquittal. Relying on its own mishandling of the governmental immunity issue,4 the district court
granted the motion for acquitta1,l set aside the jury's verdict,
and held Manypenny not guilty!
The state sought appellate review of the district court's ac1. The charge was brought under ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN. 13-249(A)-(B) (1976).
2. The removal was ordered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1976), which provides:
A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against
any of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of
the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is
pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person
acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on account
of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for
the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the
revenue.
3. Manypenny moved for arrest of judgment under FED.R. CRIM.P. 34 or, alternatively, for a new trial under FED. R. CRIM.P. 33. The court granted the Rule 34 motion.
4. The district court said:
Procedurally, it is unclear if the determination as to whether defendant Manypenny was carrying out federal duties in performing the act should be decided
as a question of law by the Court or should be decided by a jury as a question
of fact. . . .
In either event, this Court committed fundamental error; the issue was not
properly resolved by the Court a t the time of trial. The Court should have
considered this principle of law and thus granted defendant's motion for verdict
of acquittal or failing that should have submitted the matter to the jury on
altogether different instructions which embodied this federal law on the matter
of the officer's reasonable belief.
Arizona v. Manypenny, 445 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (D. Ariz. 1977).
5. The judgment of acquittal was granted under FED.R. CRIM.P. 29(c).
6. Arizona v. Manypenny, 445 F. Supp. 1123, 1127-28 (D. Ariz. 1977).
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tion before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A threejudge panel considered the appeal and, with one judge dissenting,
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. The majority concluded that
the state did not have the specific statutory authorization required for the prosecution to appeal an adverse decision in a
criminal case .7

Whether a state has a right of appeal when prosecuting a
criminal case in federal court is a question that has never before
been litigated."lthough
it has not arisen before, it is an extremely important question. If states lose their right to appeal in
criminal prosecutions against federal officers when those prosecutions are removed to federal court, the delicate balance of federalism will be upset.

A. Federalism and Criminal Law
The nature of the balance between state and national interests in the federal system was illuminated in Younger v. Harris,'
in which the Supreme Court defined federalism as
a system in which there is sensitivity to the ligitimate interests
of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and
7. Arizona v. Manypenny, 608 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1979).
8. However, the question whether the District of Columbia or the Virgin Islands,
neither of which is a sovereign state, can appeal such a decision has been litigated. In
United States v. Cefaratti, 202 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 907 (1953),
the court of appeals found that the government had broad rights of appeal in the District
of Columbia because of a statute passed by Congress to govern criminal prosecutions in
the District of Columbia. D.C. CODESj 23-105 (1951) (current version a t D.C. CODE@ 23104 (1973)).
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Hamilton, 475 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1973), the Third
Circuit ruled that the government of the Virgin Islands had no right to appeal from an
adverse decision of the federal district court in a criminal case because there was no
statutory authorization for such an appeal. Hamilton is distinguishable from the instant
case. The Virgin Islands is a territory and the federal district court serves as an appellate
court for the Municipal Court of the Virgin Islands, while in the instant case Arizona is a
sovereign state and the criminal case was removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §
1442(a)(1) (1976).
9. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger u. Harris involved an attempt by a criminal defendant
to have a district attorney enjoined from prosecuting him under an act that was allegedly
unconstitutional on its face. A three-judge district court declared the act overbroad and
void for vagueness and granted the injunction. The Supreme Court reversed, relying in
part on the concept of federalism. See Dittfurth, The Younger Abstention Doctrine: Primary State Jurisdiction Over Law Enforcement, 10 ST. MARY'SL.J. 445 (1979).
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protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to
do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States.'"
.

The Supreme Court has recognized that preventing and dealing
with crime is one of these legitimate state activities and "much
more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government.""
The recognition that dealing with crime is primarily the business of the states has led to "a strong judicial policy against
federal interference with state criminal proceedings."I2 Not only
have the courts adhered to this policy, but "[slince the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases
free from interference by federal court^."^^ And yet, the federal
government has recognized, by enacting 28 U.S.C. $ 144214and
its predecessors, that it must interfere in certain state prosecutions in order to protect itself in the exercise of its constitutional
powers.YI'he federal government needs to intervene in prosecutions against federal officers for acts committed under color of
their offices by removing the prosecutions to federal court because the federal government
can act only through its officers and agents, and they must act
within the States. If, when thus acting, and within the scope of
their authority, those officers can be arrested and brought to
trial in a State court, for an alleged offence against the law of
the State, . . . and if the general government is powerless to
interfere at once for their protection, . . . the operations of the
general government may a t any time be arrested a t the will of
one of its members. The legislation of a State may be unfriendly.
It may affix penalties to acts done under the immediate direction of the national government, and in obedience to its
10. 401 U.S. at 44. The Supreme Court defined the related notion of "comity" as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance
of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways.

Id.
11. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977).
12. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 600 (1975).
13. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. a t 43.
14. (1976). This statute provides for removal to federal court of criminal prosecutions
against federal agents or officers. For the text of subsec. (a) of 5 1442, see note 2 supra.
15. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1879).
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laws. . . . And even if, after trial and final judgment in the
State court, the case can be brought into the United States court
for review, the officer is withdrawn from the discharge of his
duty during the pendency of the prosecution, and the exercise
of acknowledged Federal power arrested.16

The conflict between a state's interest in enforcing its own
laws and the federal government's interest in protecting its officers and agents in the legitimate performance of their duties creates a serious problem for federalism. The removal approach is
an elegant solution to this problem. It allows a state to continue
its prosecution while permitting the defendant to plead a defense
of governmental immunity" in a forum receptive to that defense.
If the federal courts are evenhanded in their application of the
law, the removal approach does not upset the balance of federalism; federal interests and rights can be vindicated in a way that
does not unduly interfere with legitimate state activities.

B. Choice of Law in Criminal Cases
Removed to Federal Court
The Erie doctrine governing choice of law in civil diversity
cases does not apply in criminal removal cases.lRInstead, choice
of law in criminal removal cases is governed by a separate set of
rules that has grown out of the special considerations in this area
of the law. For instance, the federal courts look to state law to
define the criminal offense." If they did not, removal would defeat the prosecution because there is usually not a comparable
federal law to apply. And, of necessity, federal law must govern
the defense of official immunity,*O which the removal statutes
Otherwise, a state could abrogate
were designed to ~afeguard.~'
the official immunity defense.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "apply to criminal
16. Id. a t 263.
17. "If a person is authorized to do an act by the law of the United States, and if he
does no more than what is necessary and proper for him t o do, he is innocent of any crime
against the laws of any state." Arizona v. Manypenny, 445 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (D. Ariz.
1977). See Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing the history and present
status of the official immunity defense).
18. The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. $ 1652 (1976), upon which the Erie doctrine
is based, is limited by its terms to civil cases. Decisions subsequent to Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), have limited the holding of Erie almost exclusively to
diversity cases. E.R., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947).
19. North Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 F. 734, 735 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1896).
20. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 272 (1879).
21. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969).
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prosecutions removed to the United States district courts from
state courts and govern all procedure after removal."22The Advisory Committee on Rules states in a note following Rule 54 that
in removal cases under 28 U.S.C. 1442 "the Federal court applies the substantive law of the State, but follows Federal procedure ."23
The case law supports the Advisory Committee's formulation. In Tennessee v. Davis2"he Supreme Court held a predecessor of section 1442 constitutional and answered for the first time
the question whether there was any mode of procedure prescribed
in criminal removal cases. In that case the Court said:
[Tlhe mode of trial is sufficiently obvious. The circuit courts
of the United States have all of the appliances which are needed
for the trial of any criminal case. They adopt and apply the laws
of the State in civil cases, and there is no more difficulty in
administering the State's criminal law. They are not foreign
courts. . . . [I]n cases of criminal prosecutions for alleged offences against a State, in which arises a defence under United
States law, the general government should take cognizance of
the case and try it in its own courts, according to its own forms
of proceeding.*"

The cases subsequent to Tennessee v . Davis have uniformly
agreed that state law should govern the substantive rights of the
parties and federal law should govern the pr~cedure.~Wnfortunately, not everything is clearly substantive or clearly procedural,
and case law does not provide much guidance for making that
distinction in a close case.

C. Limitations on Appeals by the Prosecution
The state prosecution's right of appeal was called into question in Manypenny because of the rule prohibiting appeals by the
prosecution without express statutory authorization. This rule
has its roots in English common law.27It stems from the same
22. FED.R. CRIM.P. 54(b)(l).
23. 18 U.S.C. app. Rule 54(b)(l) note (1976).
24. 100 U.S. 257 (1879).
25. Id. at 271-72. See also Maryland v. Soper (No. I), 270 U.S. 9, 32 (1926).
26. See, e.g., Miller v. Kentucky, 40 F.2d 820, 822 (6th Cir. 1930); Carter v. Tennessee, 18 F.2d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 1927); Virginia v. Felts, 133 F. 85,92 (C.C.W.D.Va. 1904).
27. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90,96-97 (1967); Carroll v. United States, 354
U.S. 394, 400 (1957); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892). See generally
Article, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12 COLUM.
J.L. &
Soc. PROB.295 (1976); Comment, Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals by the Govern-
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considerations that spawned the double jeopardy prohibitionzR-"a general policy in favor of finality and against repeated
ve~ations"~%f
the defendant. Early in the history of this country
an overwhelming majority of state courts adopted this rule limit. ~ ~response, most state legislaing appeals by the p r o ~ e c u t i o n In
tures enacted statutes that gave the prosecution a right of appeal
at least in certain circumstance^.^^
Although state courts quickly adopted rules limiting the
right of state prosecutors to appeal, the Supreme Court of the
United States was not confronted with the question whether federal prosecutors had an inherent right of appeal until United
s ~1892.
~ In Sanges the Supreme Court followed
States v. S a n ~ e in
the weight of state authority and adopted the rule that the prosecution" has no right of appeal without express authorization by
statute?' In subsequent decisions federal courts have unalteringly
adhered to this rule requiring express statutory authorization; a
general grant of jurisdiction such as 28 U.S.C. 8 1291" has not
ment in Criminal Cases, 80 DICK.L. REV.525 (1976); Comment, Double Jeopardy and
Government Appeals of Criminal Dismissals, 52 TEX.L., REV.303 (1974); Note, Limited
Right of Appeal for the State, 14 Hous. L. REV.735 (1977).
28. U.S. CONST.amend. V.
29. Article, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB.295, 303 (1976).
30. For a survey of early state cases, see United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312
(1892). According to one commentator, a few state courts have held that their states have
an inherent right of appeal, a t least in some circumstances. See Note, Criminal
Procedure-Right of the State to Appeal, 45 K Y . L.J. 628, 628 & n.3 (1957).
31. One commentator has noted;
Today only Texas, Georgia, and Nevada have no right of appeal in criminal
cases from an adverse judgment; conversely, three states, Connecticut, Vermont, and Wisconsin, have a right of appeal equal to defendant's. Between these
extremes are jurisdictions which recognize by statute the State's right of appeal
from pretrial motions and on questions of law.
Note, Limited Right of Appeal for the State, 14 Hous. L. REV.735, 737 (1977).
32. 144 U.S. 310 (1892).
33. The Court's adoption of this rule in Sanges has been binding only on federal
prosecutors. Each state has been free to adopt or reject this rule. And it is not clear
whether all states have adopted the rule. See State v. Lee, 64 Conn. 265,30 A. 1110 (1894).
It was not until Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), that the Court even held that
the fifth amendment's double jeopardy prohibition applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment.
34. 144 U.S. a t 312, 323.
35. (1976). Known as the final judgment rule, § 1291 reads:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court
for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court.
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been enough?
Congress responded to Sanges and its progeny with the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907,:'' which gave the government limited
rights of appeal. In 1971 Congress amended the Act,:Vxoadening
the government's right of appeal to all cases in which the Constitution does not prohibit an appeal." The legislative history of the
1971 amendments makes it clear that Congress intended to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement and the quality of
criminal justice by removing archaic barriers to appeals by federal prosecutors. J0

In the instant case the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the
novel question: Does a state prosecution have a right of appeal
in a criminal case removed to federal court? Although recognizing
that their decision would substantially affect "the delicate balance of our federal system,"" the majority held that there was no
statutory authorization for such an appeal.
The court applied the widely accepted rule that the prosecution has no right to appeal an adverse decision without express
statutory authorization. After examining the federal enabling
statute, 18 U.S.C. 5 3731,J2and its legislative history,':' the majority concluded that since Congress had not considered appeals by
state prosecutors, the statute should be strictly construed as au36. See, e.g., Dibella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 130 (1962).
37. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (current version a t 18 U.S.C. § 3731
(1976)).
38. Act of Jan. 2, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-644, 14(a), 84 Stat. 1890 (codified a t 18
U.S.C. Q 3731 (1976)).
39. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975). See generally 1978 B.Y.U. L.
REV.742.
40. S. REP. NO. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 18-19 (1970).
41. 608 F.2d at 1200.
42. (1976). The statute provides in part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of
appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an
indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal
shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution
prohibits further prosecution.

....
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
purposes.
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) (emphasis added).
43. S. REP.NO. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); H.R. REP.NO. 1768, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 21 (1970).
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thorizing only appeals by federal prosecutors. The majority also
held that the court could not look to a state statute to authorize
an appeal by state prosecutors because federal law rather than
state law governs cases removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C.
4 l442(a)(1).JJ
Judge Kennedy, in a dissenting opinion, expressed concern
that the decision would create serious federalism problems. He
offered several bases for appeallate jurisdiction to avoid these
problems. First, he argued that 18 U.S.C. (j 3731 should be liberally construed to authorize an appeal by a state prosecuting in
federal court. Second, he argued that 28 U.S.C. 8 1291J5granted
appellate jurisdiction. Finally, he rejected the majority's conclusion that federal law governed all aspects of the case. Citing a
note of the Advisory Committee on Rules that states that in section 1442 removal cases, "the Federal Courts apply the substan~~
tive law of the State, but follow Federal p r o ~ e d u r e , "the'dissent
suggested that the right of appeal could be considered substantive, thus coming under state law.

A.

The Effect of the Manypenny Decision

The decision in Manypenny creates an unfortunate situation: when a criminal prosecution is removed to federal court, the
state is denied any right of appeal that it would otherwise have
had in its own courts. The denial of such a substantial right is a
serious invasion of state sovereignty, an invasion that upsets the
delicate balance of the federal system. Moreover, the decision
places unlimited power in the hands of a federal trial judge to
acquit another federal official who may have committed serious
offenses against a state or its citizenry. With such power concentrated in the hands of one person whose actions are not subject
to review, the potential for abuse is great. The result of the decision is as anomalous as it is unfortunate when contrasted with the
congressional policy allowing the federal government to bring any
~
formulated to
appeal not barred by the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n a, ~policy
prevent district court judges from frustrating congressional objectives in law enforcement?
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

608 F.2d at 1200.
See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
18 U.S.C. app. Rule 54(b)(l) note (1976).
See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
C. WRIGHT,
LAWOF FEDERALCOURTS§ 105 (3d ed. 1976).
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R. Flaws i n the Court's Analysis
The majority in Manaypennyrecognized some of the negative
consequences that would result from their decision b@ felt compelled by their analysis of the applicable law to deny the state a
right of appeal.lPHowever, this conclusion is not the only rational
conclusion that can be drawn; as the dissent pointed out, there
are other ways to analyze the issues, some of which lead to a
better result. Had the court used an analytical approach that
more squarely faced the issues presented by this case, it probably
would have decided the case differently.
The major flaw in the court's analytical approach was that
it did not first consider whether state or federal law governed the
state's right of appeal in a criminal removal case. Instead, the
court a priori assumed that the case was governed by the federal
version of the rule requiring express statutory authorization for an
appeal by the prosecution. Implicit in the application of the federal version of the rule was the assumption that federal law governs the right of appeal in section 1442 removal cases. Consequently, the court first looked to a federal statute to satisf'y the
requirement of statutory authorization.
After deciding that the federal statute did not authorize an
appeal by the state, the majority summarily dismissed the possibility t h a t a state statute could provide such authorization."
While it is not impossible to conclude that state law does not
apply in this context, the court's reasoning and the authority that
it cited cannot support this conclusion.
The court's argument against using state law to authorize an
appeal consisted of the following syl10gism:~~
First premise:
"In a case arising under federal law, federal law, rather than
state law, ~ o n t r o l s . " ~ ~

Second premise:
"A case before the federal courts under 9 1442(a)(l) is one
-

-

49. The majority in Manypenn.~stated:
We share the concerns expressed by Judge Kennedy in his dissent that the
policy of 9 3731, which is designed to "prevent erroneous trial court rulings from
thwarting lawful prosecutions," is equally applicable to state prosecutions and
federal prosecutions, and that not allowing state appeals in cases removed to
the federal courts under 5 1442(a)(l) has a substantial effect on the delicate
balance of our federal system. However, we cannot rewrite § 3731 for Congress.
608 F.2d a t 1200.
50. Id.
51. The court reversed the order of the parts, stating the conclusion first, then the
second premise, and finally, the first premise.
52. 608 F.2d at 1200.
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within the judicial power of the United States, for it arises under
federal law. "53

Conclusion:
"[We cannot] look to state law as providing Arizona with a
right to appeal in this case."54

The court cited several civil casesss to support the first premise,
and Tennessee v. Daviss6 to support the second. The authority
used by the court to support its argument is faulty because (1)
the distinction between civil law and criminal law weakens, if not
destroys, the precedential value of the civil cases used to support
the first premise, and (2) criminal removal cases do not "arise
under" federal law in the same sense as do federal, nondiversity
civil cases
None of the civil cases cited by the court were grounded on
rights created by state law. In every instance, the right sought to
be enforced was created by federal statute." Criminal removal
cases originate under state law in state courts. In the context of
a criminal removal case such as Tennessee v. Davis, the statement, "[a] case before the federal courts under § 1442(a)(l) is
one within the judicial power of the United States, for it arises
under federal law,"" means only that federal courts are constitutionalIy empowered to try a criminal case that has been removed
from a state court pursuant to a federal statute. Tennessee v.
Davis actually supports the conclusion that federal courts should
try criminal removal cases under state substantive law using federal p r o c e d ~ r e . ~ ~
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942); Deitrick v. Greaney,
309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343,
349-53 (1939); United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 1979).
56. 100 U.S. a t 262-65.
57. Judge Choy. who wrote the opihion in Man.ypenn.y, may have relied too heavily
on reasoning and authority from the opinion in United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996 (9th
Cir. 1979), which he authored earlier in 1979. Compare 608 F.2d a t 1200 with 589 F.2d a t
998-99.
58. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), and Deitrick v. Greaney,
309 U.S. 190 (1940). were based on violations of federal banking law; Board of County
Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939), was based on rights flowing from a federal
statute and a treaty between the United States and an Indian nation; United States v.
Crain, 589 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1979), was based on a loan transaction authorized by federal
statute.
59. 608 F.2d a t 1200.
60. 100 U.S. a t 271-72.
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C . An Alternative Analytical Approach6'
The first issue that should have been decided in Manypenny
was whether state or federal law governs the state's right of ap61. T h e following diagrams illustrate the analytical approach used by the
Mcrnypennv court and the analytical approach suggested by this Note:

A)tul!jticctl Approctch Used b g the Manypenny Court

The court began its analysis by applying the following rule:
An appeal by the prosecution must be expressly authorized
by statute.

Does a federal statute
authorize a n appeal b
a state prosecuting in
federal court?

Prosecution may

4
I
I

No

I

v
Can a state statute
be used to authorizc this appeal?

statute t h a t

I
I
I
I

No
h

v
No statutory authorization, therefore
prosecution h a s no right to appeal.

I
+------- J
No

I

The solid lines represent the choices made by the court.
The dotted lines represent options that the court recognized but did not take.

CASENOTE
Awull~ticalApproach Suggested b y this Note

..
Should state or
law govern a state's
right of appeal?

the prosecution be

I

I by statute?

!

Prosecution may
bring this appeal
if i t is not
barred by the
fifth amendnient.

State

Does a federal statute
authorize this appeal
by a state prosecuting
I

[ Yes

1 IUnder state law must a n
appeal h y the prosecution bz expressly authorized by the statute?

+

not appeal.

may appeal.

I

-----may appeal.

The double solid lines represent the choices advocated by this Note.
The solid lines indicate the path which the court would have had to follow to reach its
result using this analytical approach.
The dotted lines represent other options.
* ARIZ.REV. STAT.ANN. 6 13-4032 (1979 Cum. Supp.) authorizes an appeal by the
state from "[aln order arresting judgment," or "[aln order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the state." This statute could be used to authorize an appeal
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peal. The case law and the Advisory Committee on Rules suggest
a substantive-procedural test for deciding which law should govern.62However, the case law does not classify the right of appeal
as procedural or substantive. The only guidance given by criminal removal cases for making t h a t distinction is dictum in
Virginia v. F e l t ~ , ~ Ywhich
n
the court construed language in
Tennessee v. Davis" '"as a direction to adopt the state law in all
respects except as to mere matters of procedure."" The time limits for taking an appeal and the manner in which an appeal can
be takev would seem to be such matters of procedure. But the
right of appeal is a substantial right, one which parties would
jealously guard, and certainly not a mere matter of procedure.
Indeed, in 18 U.S.C. 8 3772,'Vhe statute authorizing the Supreme Court to make rules governing procedure after verdict in
criminal cases in federal court, Congress distinguished the right
of appeal from matters of procedure saying, "The right of appeal
shall continue in those cases in which appeals are authorized by
law, but the rules made as herein authorized may prescribe the
times for and manner of taking appeals . . . ."" Based on this
language in section 3772 and on a commonsense distinction between substance and procedure, the right of appeal appears to be
substantive and, therefore, governed by state law.
Allowing state law to govern a state's right of appeal also
satisfies the pertinent policy considerations. Federal interests are
not jeopardized if state law continues to govern the state's right
of appeal following removal. Federal courts have no difficulty
applying state law,Mand there is no danger of harming the federal
interests that removal is designed to p r o t e ~ t . The
~ ' federal government's interest in protecting its sovereign power is fully vindicated when removal takes place; its officers then have the privilege of pleading their defenses before a sympathetic forum. The
in Manypenn.~.See Arizona ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 123,538 P.2d 397
(1975); Arizona v. Allen, 27 Ariz. App. 577, 557 P.2d 176 (1976); Arizona v. Gradillas, 25
Ariz. App. 510, 544 P.2d 1111 (1976).
The dissent in Manypenny concluded that under state law the prosecution could
appeal. 608 F.2d at 1202-03 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
63. 133 F. 85 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1904).
64. For the language from Tennessee u. Davis, see text accompanying note 25 supra.
65. 133 F. at 92.
66. (1976).
67. 18 U.S.C. (i 3772 (1976).
68. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. at 271.
69. For a discussion of the purpose of the removal statute, see text accompanying
notes 15-16 supra.
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removal statutes were designed to do no more than insure federal
officers this opportunity: "Neither immunity nor impunity is
guaranteed the alleged offender; the statute merely transfers his
trial to the Federal courts."70 On the other hand, if the state's
right of appeal is curtailed through the application of federal law
when state criminal prosecutions are removed to federal courts,
the state's sovereign interest in exercising its police powers is
threatened. In such circumstances, a single federal judge could
frustrate the state's legitimate law enforcement objectives by
unreasonably expanding the defense of official immunity. The
judge's error would never be remedied because it could not be
When the federal interests are balanced against the state's
interests in the question of which law should govern the right of
appeal in criminal removal cases, federal interests do not outweigh the state's interest in protecting its police powers. Therefore, the court should apply the substantive-procedural test,
which dictates that state law should govern.
Assuming that it does decide that state law governs, the
court should next consider whether state law requires express
statutory authorization for an appeal by the prosecution. If there
is no requirement for statutory authorization, the state may bring
any appeal that is not barred by the double jeopardy prohibition.
If express authorization is required, the court should examine the
state's statutes for such authorization. For most states, the court
will find authorization for appeal of a t least some lower court
Even if the court decides that the right of appeal is procedural, and therefore governed by federal law, it does not necessarily follow that the state has no right of appeal. The statute, 18
U.S.C. 8 3731, which authorizes appeals "by the United States,''
can be interpreted to authorize appeals by the states. The majority's strict interpretation of section 3731 is reasonable but not

70. North Carolina v. Carr, 386 F.2d 129, 131 (4th Cir. 1967).
71. For example, in the instant case, the trial judge did not know if the defense of
official immunity should be treated as a matter of fact or as a matter of law. Arizona v.
Manypenny. 445 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (D. Ariz. 1977). Such a question could not be
resolved until a defendant appeals, because, under the Manypenny analysis, the state
cannot appeal. If judges hereafter decide to treat it as a matter of law and always acquit
defendants claiming that defense, the state can never test the correctness of the decision
to characterize it as a matter of law.
72. See note 31 supra.
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compelling. especially in light of the statement in section 3731
that "It \he provisions of this section shall be liberally construed
to effectuate its purpose^."^" In United States v. Wilsoni4the
Supreme Court followed this admonition and ruled that federal
prosecutors could appeal from judgments of acquittal, although
section 3731 mentions only decisions, judgments, or orders
"dismissing an indictment or information." A construction of section 3731 allowing states to appeal would be consistent with the
Court's approach in Wilson.
Construing section 3731 to give the states a right of appeal
would also be consistent with the way the Manypenny court applied the federal version of the rule against appeals by the prosecution to the state. Of necessity, the federal version of the rule
. ~ ~applying the federal
applies only to the federal g o ~ e r n m e n tBy
version of the rule to the state, the court places the state in the
position of the federal government. Once in the position of the
federal government for purposes of applying the rule limiting
appeals to those authorized by statute, the state should be left
in that position for purposes of applying section 3731.
Even though section 3731 can reasonably be interpreted to
authorize appeals by state prosecutions, there are some inherent
problems with applying federal law to decide if a state prosecution has a right of appeal. If section 3731 is construed to give a
right of appeal only to the United States, problems of federalism
arise.?Wn the other hand, if section 3731 is construed to grant a
right of appeal to states in addition to the federal government,
some states will have greater rights of appeal in federal court than
they would have in their own courts.77In those states, defendants
with a right of removal may be chilled in the exercise of this right
by the knowledge that the state has greater rights of appeal in
federal court.

73. 18 U.S.C. 4 3731 (1976).
74. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
75. See note 33 supra.
76. Congress could solve the federalism problems by amending § 3731 to provide for
appeals by state prosecutions in federal court.
77. For a discussion of the limitations on the rights of the various states to appeal in
criminal cases in their own courts, see note 31 supra. As interpreted in United States v.
Wilson. 420 U.S. at 337. 4 3731 grants the right of appeal in all cases in which appeal by
the prosecution is not barred by the double jeopardy prohibition.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Manbypennydecision is not based on thorough analysis.
The court failed to adequately consider whether state or federal
law should govern the state's right of appeal. It dismissed the
possibility of using state law to authorize an appeal, relying on
authority that does not apply to criminal removal cases. The
court also failed to consider the substantive-procedural test that
has previously been used in criminal removal cases for determining which law should govern. Had the court applied this test it
probably would have decided that the right of appeal was substantive, and therefore governed by state law. Moreover, the
court's decision does not satisfy policy considerations involving
the balance of federalism that apply to the issues. The denial of
a state's right of appeal in a criminal removal case when the state
would have had a right of appeal in its own courts is a serious
invasion of that state's sovereignty, an invasion that is not necessary to effectuate the purposes of the removal statutes. These
considerations of federalism and a careful analysis of the applicable law lead to the conclusion that state law should govern the
right of appeal in criminal removal cases.

J. Grant Walker

